There is a whole aspect of Singer's view that we have mostly left to one side. In an earlier paper, Singer took up the question of whether our obligations to those nearby might be greater than our obligations to distant peoples. His answer was no. But on reading the argument, one might have been suspicious, since normally we think that our obligations to friends and family are much greater than our obligations to strangers. And indeed, if something like this is true, it could weaken Singer's famine relief argument, since it might turn out that our obligations to unknown and distant people are slight.

On the other hand, there is a familiar moral ideal of impartiality: we incline to think that the moral point of view is an impartial point of view, treating everyone alike. Insofar as that is true, our sense that obligations to friends and family are greater might turn out to be mistaken. The essays by Blum and Rachels argue for differing conclusions on this issue.

BLUM

1. In Impartiality, Beneficence and Friendship, Lawrence Blum argues that impartiality is only required in certain situations. In particular, beneficence to one's friends does not violate a duty of impartiality.

Now Blum is aware that attachments can lead us to violate duties. For example, officials sometimes display favoritism; doctors sometimes reserve their best treatment for their friends. But there is no general conflict here. There is nothing wrong in my phoning a sick friend rather than a sick stranger. Furthermore, the examples up to now suggest to Blum what might lie behind the difference between cases in which impartiality is called for and cases in which it isn't: cases calling for impartiality tend to involve "an official capacity within some public institution or practice." For example, judges must judge impartially. And the fact that it is hard to do this if one's friends are involved is the main reason why we think judges shouldn't sit on such cases. But Blum points out that even within institutional roles, impartiality has its limits. So long as the doctor has given full and adequate attention to her other patients, she may spend extra time on her friend's case, for example.

2. Blum attempts to analyze the cases more carefully. The claim so far is that institutional roles (judge, teacher, doctor... ) can require impartiality. Impartiality may also be required in some other cases. But Blum believes that not all duties arise out of the demands of impartiality. He offers three different sorts of cases for us to consider:

a) Cases requiring (up to a point, at least) strict impartiality. Judges, teachers, etc. fall in this category.

b) Some cases require a certain amount of attention to others, but not strict impartiality. For example, if a friend and a stranger are both shovelling their cars out, I am normally justified in helping my friend rather than the stranger. If my friend needs only a little help and the stranger needs much, I may be obliged to help the stranger first. But even here, it isn't clear that impartiality is the best explanation. It is at least as plausible that I have a general duty of beneficence, and that such situations call for exercising beneficence rather than for displaying impartiality. On the other hand, if my friend and the strange are in equal need helping the stranger first (perhaps because I tossed a coin in order to be impartial) would be inappropriate; it would neglect my special relationship and obligation to my friend.

Blum puts this a bit confusingly by saying

whatever consideration is appropriate regarding the weal or woe of the stranger is unaffected by the presence of the friend, and so is not connected to impartiality.

Blum sums up by saying that our obligations to others exist whether or not our friend is in the situation -- beneficence is at work -- and second, impartiality is not actually required when the friend is present.

3. What is the scope of impartiality? So far, Blum takes himself to show that some of our obligations to friends and to others can be understood without any appeal to impartiality. But he goes further and attempts to define the limits of impartiality. His starting point is a remark by the 19th-century English philosopher Henry Sidgwick:

What then do we mean by a just man in matters where law-observance does not enter? It is natural to reply that we mean an impartial man, one who seeks with equal care to satisfy all claims which he recognizes as valid and does not let himself be unduly influenced by personal preferences

the application of impartiality depends on the pre-existence of claims on the part of the persons involved... It is only when someone has a certain claim on a benefit that it is a matter of impartiality to give due regard to his interest in that benefit... It is thus not impartiality regarding interests per se which defines impartiality, as it is impartiality regarding interests in which the parties involved have some claim... This claim is not itself grounded in impartiality, but is rather the ground of it.

This may help make the point more clearly. Suppose I have a positive duty to help out in cases like this. I do not have a duty to be impartial in my methods of choosing whom I will help. Some bases for choosing might be morally unsavory. But I am not obliged to rank my friend's interests equally with everyone else's. And this is different from a cases (considered also by Blum) in which I am asked to settle a dispute between two people, one of whom happens to be my friend. In that case, I am obliged to ignore my special relationship with my friend; in that case, I am required to be impartial.

So Blum concludes that

(i)mpartiality is... appropriate only in certain situations. It is not a perspective which defines what it is for us to take up a moral point of view on our actions (regarding our friends.)

Blum points out that institutional contexts -- courts, classrooms, etc. -- often define claims sharply in a way that ordinary circumstances don't. That is why the clearest cases in which we must be impartial are institutional contexts. But even there, room remains for partiality. I may have to judge impartially between my friend and a stranger in certain circumstances. But I have no special obligation to comfort the stranger if things go badly for him or her in the (fair) judgement; I am both at liberty to comfort my friend and perhaps to some extent obliged to by the demands of friendship.

Perhaps the advocate of impartiality could make a reply here using Blum's own concepts. Perhaps friendship creates claims. My friends, if they are my friends, have a claim to my attention that strangers don't have. That doesn't mean that my friend's claims outweigh all other claims and all demands of beneficence. But if friendship does create claims, then in choosing between a friend and a stranger, the "spirit" of impartiality might require me to choose my friend because of his claims on me. However, this seems a little strained. And Blum himself would point out that in some cases, I am allowed to choose on the basis of sympathy, liking, etc. even when there is no question of my owing anything to the person involved. If I have two neighbors who both need help shovelling their cars out, the fact that one typically smiles when he sees me and the other ignores me does not mean that the one who smiles has a claim on me. But it would be perfectly acceptable for me to help him first; I am under no obligation to choose "impartially."

If Blum is right, then the moral point of view is not defined by impartiality; impartiality is a point of view that morality sometimes requires, but not always. Rachels is less sure, however, as we will see in the next set of notes.

© copyright Allen Stairs, 1997

Web surfer's caveat: These are course notes, intended to augment classroom discussion of the issues and readings. They should be read as such and are not intended for general distribution or publication.