Before we get to Cameron, a preliminary point. There has been a lot of discussion in recent years about the causes of homosexuality. Some think it is genetic; others think it is a matter of the intrauterine environment, especially hormone levels at crucial times. Still others think it is early childhood experiences. The right story is not fully known and wil probably turn out not to be simple. Suppose, however, that it is genetically determined. (In fact, the best evidence is that it has a genetic component but is not simply determined by genes.) What would be the moral implications?
The answer is: nothing clear. Compare: certain violent tendencies may have a genetic component, for all we know. That wouldn't make violence morally acceptable. Certain tendencies to be a kindly and sympathetic person may have a genetic component. That wouldn't make kindliness a bad thing. The point is this: having a homosexual orientation doesn't make you have sex. The same goes for having a heterosexual orientation. A person might be both heterosexual and highly sexed. It doesn't follow that they will be promiscuous, nor does it follow that it would be acceptable if they were.
Another very important point: we are dealing here with an empirical issue. In other words, we are dealing with a matter of fact that can only be decided on the basis of evidence. People have an alarming tendency to think they know the answers to empirical questions when the answers are neither obvious nor even known. And false facts can lead to impaired ethical judgements. We then turned to Cameron.
Turning to Cameron, the first important point he makes -- surely correct -- is that discrimination is not always wrong. To discriminate is to make distinctions and, by extension, to treat different sorts of cases or individuals differently. Forbidding people without medical training to perform surgery is a form of discrimination. But it is perfectly rational and appropriate discrimination. Condemning robbery and murder, and punishing people who commit those crimes, discriminates among forms of conduct. But not in any objectionable way. In fact, in some contexts it is a compliment to refer to someone as a discriminating individual. It is a way of saying that they exercise careful judgment. Prejudice is a form of discrimination, but prejudice is treating certain things differently without good reason -- on the basis, typically, of strong negative feelings that don't have a rational basis. Racial discrimination is a form of prejudice and is wrong because it is unjustifiable. Whether treating gay people differently is mere discrimination in the neutral sense or, on the other hand, unfounded prejudice, is the issue before us. Cameron's view is that some level of discrimination against homosexuality and homosexual people is rational and justified. Just how much he doesn't say; just what forms it should take he leaves almost, but not quite, unaddressed.
Cameron begins his case for discrimination against homosexuality by considering what is sometimes called the "wisdom of the ages." He tells us that in all known societies and in all major religions, heterosexuality has been accorded higher status than homosexuality. He goes on to say that some supposed counterexamples to this thesis don't stand up to scrutiny. To all this it might be replied that people can be -- and have been -- overwhelmingly wrong about any number of things. The mere fact that most people have believed homosexuality is wrong doesn't prove that it is. After all, most people used to believe that inter-racial marriage is wrong and slavery right.
Cameron would agree. But he would insist: the fact that homosexuality has been so consistently regarded as undesirable puts the burden of proof on anyone who wants to argue against discrimination. The notion of the burden of proof in an argument is important. If you insist that animals can talk on Christmas Eve so long as no one is watching, I'm under no obligation even to take you seriously. And if you set out to make this seem plausible, you will have to go a long way before I do need to take you seriously. Generally speaking, if someone is arguing for a view that departs significantly from common knowledge, the obligation is on them to make the case.
Having said that, it's important to bear in mind: as soon as interesting objections to common wisdom are raised, things are different. Simply appealing to common opinion is no longer adequate. Again, Cameron could agree. But he would add something: if the stakes are small -- if being wrong about the issue in question has few consequences -- then abandoning the common view on relatively weak evidence may be acceptable. If the stakes are high, then the burden of proof is much higher. Cameron maintains that on the issue of homosexuality the stakes are very high. We are dealing with matters that bear on procreation and the family. Both of these are extremely important. If changing the way we deal with homosexuality threatens to have serious consequences for procreation or family, then we will need very weighty reasons for abandoning tradition.
Behind this is a view that is often associated with Burkean conservatism. Our social arrangements and institutions have evolved over a long period of time. They have been delicately adjusted to the needs of human society, and large changes in them may very well prove disruptive. Before we start tinkering with social institutions and practices, we want to be very sure we know what we are doing. Although this may seem too cautious for some, it is certainly a plausible and respectable view. Now we turn to the substance of Cameron's argument. He claims that
1) Human sexuality is entirely learned.Cameron says very little about his reasons for 1) except to note that he has discussed it at length in print elsewhere, and to point out to us the very considerable range of variation in human behavior as it relates to matters sexual. Since he has made the argument elsewhere, we can certainly excuse him for not repeating it here, though a thorough evaluation of his position would require looking at that argument. As for 2), Cameron points to various factors. One is the homosociality of the very young: boys prefer, on the whole, to play with boys; girls prefer to play with girls. This, he believes, reflects important differences in interests. It is easier for boys to get along with boys, girls with girls. Now add some further factors: boys, he claims, are more interested in sex than girls, and want different things from it. Females are more interested in tenderness and compassion. They pay for this, he says, with sex. Males, he claims, are more interested in the sheer physical side of sex and pay for this with tenderness. Further, males understand male anatomy and response better than female anatomy and response. A parallel claim holds for females. So males can provide better sex for males than females can; females can provide better sex for females than males can. Finally, the young are self-centered. Gratification is more important than the hard work that intersex relationships require.2) Although each of us could learn to be homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual, certain other facts about society and about males and females make it very likely that without considerable social pressure, most people would turn out to be homosexual.
3) Homosexuality is associated with various undesirable personality traits, and
4) Homosexuality does not provide the same range of possibilities for what we might term (my phrase, not Cameron's) moral growth
Taking all this into account, Cameron asks: "Does anyone doubt which way most youth would turn if equivalent social status attended homosexuality and heterosexuality?" In fact, most of our social norms, myths and images favor heterosexuality. As Cameron sees it, this is a good thing because, as he puts it, "heterosexuality needs all the help it can get." So the case for discrimination against homosexuality is based on the premise --argued for in part in the article, that without such discrimination, homosexuality might become the norm. And in addition to the consequences this would have for procreation and family, other serious consequences would follow from this.
What consequences? For one thing, Cameron claims that homosexuals are more likely to have such undesirable traits as egocentrism and superciliousness (i.e., looking down one's nose at others.) Furthermore, homosexuals are much more likely to commit suicide than heterosexuals. His final point is that sexual relationships between the sexes require more compromise, accommodation and effort than homosexual relationships. Heterosexual relationships are much more likely to promote the development of certain positive character traits. Taking all of this into account, Cameron concludes that some level of discrimination against homosexuality and homosexuals is justified.
What are we to make of this? When Cameron claims that sexuality is entirely learend, he actually has incurred a large burden of proof himself. Also, Cameron seems oddly insenstitive to the possibility that discrimination against gay people makes them more prone to suicide, for example. And while it may be true that homosexual relationships provide fewer possibilities for moral growth, on average, than heterosexual relationships, this doesn't mean that they provide none. And similarly, refusal to commit to long term relationships of any sort provides fewer opportunities for moral development. But we don't actively discriminate against people who choose to remain single.
This last remark raises another issue. We can distinguish between encouraging such institutions as marriage -- passive discsimination at most -- and active discrimination against homosexuality -- for example by firing teachers who admit they are gay. It is worth asking whether Cameron has made a case for the stronger view: that we should actively discriminate against gay people as opposed to simply encouraging what are often called traditional families. Cameron would probably respond: if he is right that failure to discriminate would lead to widespread homosexuality, then discrimination is the safest and wisest course. But this hinges on a very controversial premise.
Allen Stairs
stairs@glue.umd.edu