Mohr begins with a few factual claims that are now regarded by most authorities as outdated. Based on Kinsey's studies, the percentage of homosexual people in the population was, for a long time, estimated at around 10%. However, Kinsey's data was flawed in various ways, not least by virtue of not being a genuinely random sample. More recent (and more statistically careful) studies put the rate of homosexuality at closer to 2% to 4%.

It is not exactly clear why the percentage should be important. On the one hand, if the percentage is higher, this may suggest that homosexuality is more common, and hence more "normal" than it is sometimes held to be. It may also suggest that if discrimination against gays is indeed prejudice, then the harm is of a high magnitude. On the other hand, if the percentage is as low as it seems to be, even in a time when it is much easier for lesbi-gay people to be open about their orientation, then dire predictions that large numbers of people will turn gay if we don't discriminate seem less believable.

But in the end, the quibble about numbers does seem trivial. An analogy: Jews are a small percentage of the world's population -- perhaps no more than 2% (though I don't have any figures handy.) But anti-Semitism is still wrong. And in fact, if the world population is 5 billion, the absolute numbers of gays and lesbians will be very high -- on the order of 100 to 200 million.

Mohr spends some time examining various aspects of the stereotype of the homosexual, pointing out that it is an odd combination of things. On the one hand, gays are regarded as ridiculous. On the other hand, they are regarded as a sort of sinister threat. While not literally inconsistent, these two stereotypes form an odd pair. He also points out that various false generalizations about homosexual people -- for example, that they are more likely than heterosexuals to molest children -- persist in spite of the lack of any evidence.

On the question of whether there is discrimination against gays, Mohr is surely right in saying that the answer is yes, and that it takes a variety of forms from the subtle to the violent. Since the argument between Mohr and Cameron would be precisely on the question of whether some forms of discrimination are appropriate, merely pointing to discrimination doesn't by itself tell us much. However, one hopes that we can all agree: crimes of violence against homosexual people are not acceptable whatever one's moral view of homosexuality.

It is interesting to reflect on this a bit further. One might argue plausibly that adulterers and promiscuous heterosexuals are more of a threat to the family structure than gays could ever be. But while most people disapprove of adultery and many disapprove of premarital sex, neither form of conduct is met with anything like the reaction that homosexuality elicits from many people. On this point, many people seem to have a blind spot.

In any case, Mohr insists that discrimination against gays is bound to have a pervasive effect on their happiness. This is particularly true in the area of employment, since one's work is, for many people, an important source of self-definition and self-respect. More generally, he insists that since the consequences of discrimination are considerable, it can only be justified on the basis of compelling reasons.

What are the possible reasons? Mohr considers three categories, approached through three questions: aren't gays immoral? isn't homosexuality unnatural? and don't gays choose to be what they are?

In discussing morality, Mohr introduces an important distinction between descriptive morality and normative morality. Descriptive morality is simply an account of the moral beliefs that people actually hold. But to say that people generally hold a form of conduct to be moral or immoral is different from saying that it is really moral or immoral. The question is not: does society generally disapprove of homosexuality, but should it?

Interestingly, Mohr considers only one broad class of moral objections to homosexual conduct: ones based on religion. He notes, correctly, that there is room for disagreement within religious traditions on the question of how to interpret scriptural condemnations of homosexuality. But his more important point, perhaps, is that if the moral objection cannot be given a broad foundation -- if it rests solely on scripture, then it is not the sort of thing we think it appropriate to put into law. Ours is a society in which laws that are explicitly based on specific and debatable religious assertions are unconstitutional.

There is a moral objection to homosexual conduct that Mohr doesn't consider explicitly: that any sex outside marriage is wrong. The obvious reasons for this are, once again, religious. But an appeal to broader utilitarian grounds is possible. As many people point out, sex is an unruly instinct, best kept under reasonably tight control. The institution of marriage is a tried and true means of achieving at least a certain level of taming of the sexual urge. So a moral sanction against sex outside marriage may have a utilitarian argument in its favor. However, it is not clear where this leaves the case of homosexual sex. It could be argued that an institution of homosexual marriage would be, on the same utilitarian grounds, the best way to control the unruliness of same-sex attraction.

The next question is whether homosexual conduct is unnatural. Here there are various possible meanings for the term "unnatural," Sometimes it seems to mean simply what people disapprove of, or perhaps better yet, what they happen to find disgusting However, this is an inadequate basis for a moral view. For one thing, what people find disgusting varies enormously across cultures. To pick just one example, most of us find the idea of eating insects disgusting; in some places, it is common.

Another view is that the natural is that which fulfills some natural function, and the unnatural is whatever ignores or bypasses that function. Here, however, we have a problem. It is characteristic of humans that they are inclined to transcend the merely natural functions of things. Art and culture are, in a sense, profoundly unnatural and in another sense, profoundly an expression of the creativity of human nature. But trivial examples abound. Mohr points out that eating is the primary bioligical purpose of our mouths. In fact, we can't eat except with our mouths. But that doesn't mean that blowing bubbles is wrong, even if it is, in a certain sense, unnatural.

On the other hand, the claim may be that homosexuality violates divine purpose. But aside from the problem of knowing what God really had in mind -- a highly non-trivial problem -- we have the problem that appeals to purely religious premises are not an appropriate basis for policy in a country that believes in religious freedom.

There is also an issue of consistency here. Many people who insist that homosexuality is unnatural and therefore wrong do not object to birth control, oral sex, masturbation and, in short, to sexual practices that many heterosexuals engage in that are not intended for procreation.

We could also point out that nature is a complicated place. I discussed the case of androgen insensitivity syndrome. This is a condition in which a person who is genetically male - who has an x and a y chromosome -- develops to all outward appearances as a female because the receptors on which the male hormone androgen works are defective. Without androgen, an individual will develop the outward characteristics of a woman. Until quite recently, a person with androgen insensitivity syndrome would never have been diagnosed. She would be unable to bear children or have menstrual periods, but those conditions can have various causes. In all other respects -- psychological and morphological -- such people develop as females. Ask yourself this question: suppose a woman, Jane, marries a man, John. After the marriage, and after failing to have children, doctors finally point out to Jane that she is genetically male, and suffers from androgen insensitivity syndrome. Is the proper thing for her to divorce John? For then to stop having sexual relations? After all, through most of human history, such couples would have lived a married life normal except for the fact that they would never have children. They would have had no idea that there was any sense in which the wife was not a female. Is it reasonable to suggest that with this puzzling discovery in endrocrinology the whole moral fabric of these relationships is changed? What is the reasonable accommodation to this strange fact? After all, even as things stand, many androgen insensitive people will marry and never be diagnosed. Does this diminish the value of their feelings for their spouses? Of their relationship?

Homosexuality may well not be simply a biological condition. It is probably much more complicated than that. But the question still arises: what is the reasonable accommodation to the fact that some people find themselves attracted to members of their own sex.

Or is it fair to say that this is something that people just "find" about themselves? Might it not be more correct to say that they choose it? That homosexuals, like heterosexuals, choose their conduct is fair enough. But Mohr points out that choosing one's sexual orientation is neither like choosing one flavor of ice cream instead of another nor like choosing one's future plans. It simply does not seem to have the psychological structure of a choice at all. Rather, it seems to be something that people discover about themselves.

This, we could add, is compatible with sexual orientation being somewhat fluid. One may discover that one is attracted to someone to whom one would never have imagined being attracted. But for most people, sexual attraction is not really a matter of choice (though, of course, acting on the attraction is.)

It seems, then, unless other considerations can be offered, that condemning homosexuality because it is unnatural is a weak position, and that holding sexual orientation to be a matter of choice is a rather poor fit for the facts. This means that if there is a case to be made against homosexuality, it will have to be made on more direct moral grounds, such as an objection to any sort of extra-marital sex. But even if this case can be made, it still remains to ask: can it justify the special contempt and animosity that is often directed toward homosexuality?

This leads to the matter of what we might mean by the word "homophobia." This is not a topic that Mohr discusses, but since the word is bandied about so freely, it is worth asking.

A good definition of "homophobia" should not have the consequence that anyone who objects to homosexual conduct is automatically homophobic. And, in spite of the Greek roots of this recently-invented word (it is not a Greek term, nor is it a term with a long history) fear of homosexuals need not be the issue; that simply doesn't correspond to wide-spread usage. I would suggest that if someone has a strong negative emotional reaction to homosexuals or homosexuality, and if this reaction is based on unreasonable prejudice, then the word "homophobia" is appropriate. And I would also suggest a rule of thumb for gauging people's attitudes on this question: if a person has a much stronger negative reaction to homosexuality than to such things as adultery, fornication, oral sex among heterosexuals or masturbation, then the person is plausibly counted as homophobic, absent some sort of evidence to the contrary. Why? Because it is very hard to see what reasons -- philosophical or religious -- could justify such a strong differential reaction. The best explanation would seem to be that the reaction is the result of irrational prejudice, and hence can be counted as homophobia. But as I have noted, this is not a definition in the strict sense. It is a rule of thumb.

If Horowitz is right, however, there may be an actual component of fear underlying homophobia -- a fear in response to a threat to one's sense of identity. Interestingly, as we saw, Horowitz does not use the term "homophobia" for the attitude he discusses. But all the same, the term does not seem inappropriate.

Notice: this definition does not settle the question of whether homosexual conduct is acceptable. A person who objected equally strongly to homosexual sex and to adultery, for example, would not fall within this definition. Notice something else: I might feel disgusted or uncomfortable thinking about certain things -- say, drinking urine. But in certain cultural settings, this practice is common and is even supposed to confer health benefits. (Whether it does or not is another matter.) I am able to recognize that, and therefore, I don't let my automatic reaction influence my treatment of people who engage in this practice. The same goes for eating insects. We may not have much control over our gut reactions. But we do have control over how we respond to them. Whether or not homosexuality is wrong, our immediate "gut reactions" aren't the test.

a name="disclaimer"> © copyright Allen Stairs, 1997

Web surfer's caveat: These are course notes, intended to augment classroom discussion of the issues and readings. They should be read as such and are not intended for general distribution or publication.