Anselm's Reply to Guanilo

Anselm's reply to Guanilo makes difficult reading for philosophers. Don't be distressed if, as a student, you find it hard to unravel. However, careful reading is an absolutely essential philosophical skill, and so we will look at what Anselm says in some cases line by line.

The reply breaks into two main sections. In the first, Anselm confronts what he seems to have thought were the more serious objections, and in the process he clarifies his argument in some important ways. In the second section (beginning "Now as for the other objections you raise...") he deals with what he took to be less plausible objections and mere confusions. We begin with the former.

Anselm begins by pointing out that Guanilo is a Christian and not a fool, and says that he will address him accordingly. He then summarizes what he takes to be Guanilo's two main criticisms:

You say that something than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding no differently from that which cannot even be thought according to the true nature of anything at all. You also say that it does not follow ... that that than which a greater cannot be thought exists in reality as well simply because it exists in the understanding, any more than it follows that the Lost Island most certainly exists simply because someone who hears it described in words has no doubt that it exists in his understanding. Anselm's first reply appeals to Guanilo as a Christian. If we don't really have the concept of a being than which none greater can be thought, then we don't have the concept of God at all. Anselm writes" "I appeal to your faith and conscience as the most compelling argument that this is false."

In one way, appealing to Guanilo's Christian conscience is no reply at all. But in another way, we can see the point. Since Guanilo is a believer, he presumably does think we have the concept of God. And so it is, to say the least, odd for him to argue otherwise. But odd though the situation may be for Guanilo the believer, his arguments are still worth looking into, and we will follow Anselm in doing so.

Guanilo's first point was, indeed, that we can have all manner of false ideas in our minds, and it is not clear that considered strictly as an idea, the idea of God is any different. Ideas don't normally assure their own reality. Anselm's reply seems to bounce off the main point. He writes:

I say with certainty that if it can be so much as thought to exist, it must necessarily exist. For that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be thought of as beginning to exist. By contrast, whatever can be thought to exist, but does not in fact exist, can be thought of as beginning to exist. Therefore, it is not the case that that than which a greater can be thought can be thought to exist but does not in fact exist. If, therefore, it can be thought to exist, it does necessarily exist. The language here is hardly simple. The first task is to straighten out what Anselm is saying. Then we have to decide just how it bears on Guanilo.

The first sentence ("I say with certainty...") states the overall conclusion or main point. If God can be so much as thought to exist, God must exist, period. The second sentence states what seems to be a premise in support of this conclusion, and the third sentence expands on the premise. The premise, however, seems to raise a new issue. It says that the GCB can't be thought of as beginning to exist: if you have in mind something that can be thought of as having a beginning, you can conceive of something greater. Furthermore, and by way of making the point clearer, there are things that really can be thought to exist but don't. Golden mountains might be an example. But any such thing -- anything that really can be thought of as existing and yet doesn't exist -- can be thought of as beginning to exist.

Let's pause over this because even if its precise relevance to Guanilo is not clear, it amplifies the meaning of Anselm's crucial phrase "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." A contingent being, as we noted earlier, is one whose existence is possible but not certain. You and I are contingent beings, and we happen to exist. Golden mountains are contingent beings, and they happen not to exist. But contingent beings, Anselm is telling us, have at least one thing in common of their very nature: they can be thought of as beginning to exist. But if something cannot be thought of as having a beginning, but can otherwise be thought to exist, that thing is necessary rather than contingent; that thing must be thought of as existing.

Since Guanilo has not brought up the whole matter of the beginnings of things, it is not immediately clear why Anselm does. Perhaps the best answer is this: a being that can be thought of as having a beginning is not as great as an eternal being -- one that can have no beginning. Since nothing greater than God can be conceived, we cannot conceive of God as having a beginning; we must conceive of God as eternal. But as we just noted, eternal beings exist necessarily -- can't fail to exist. So if God can be thought at all, God can't be thought not to exist; God exists necessarily.

There is a move in this particular passage that various commentators have pointed out as a general move on which Anselm's argument relies. It is the move from thought to reality, if you will. Anselm is assuming that if something is conceivable, it is possible. This is not quite as obvious as it seems, but it goes further than that. Anselm is saying: if we conceive of something as necessary, it must be so. If we can conceive of God, and necessary existence is part of that conception, then God must exist and must be a necessary being. In particular, if I can conceive of a being that can't have a beginning, then there must be such a being. And that premise, too, is at least open to disagreement.

Whatever we make of this argument, notice that it might apply to things other than God. For example, if the the number one exists, it had no beginning. Numbers would seem to be the sorts of things such that if they exist at all, they exist eternally. So on Anselm's reasoning, if it is conceivable that the number one exists, it exists necessarily, since it is the sort of thing that couldn't exist merely contingently.

And for Anselm, it seems, the conceivable and the possible are one and the same. So if it is possible that the number one exists, it exists necessarily.

It's important to be clear about what Anselm is not saying. He is not saying that in general, if I can conceive of something, it must exist. I can conceive of a golden mountain. But there are none. The difference is this. When I conceive of a golden mountain, I am conceiving of a thing that would be contingent if it existed at all. It has the possibility of non-existence built into its nature. But not so with the number one. If it exists at all, it exists necessarily. And likewise for God.

This move seems a little worrisome. Philosophers might well agree that if numbers exist, they have eternal existence and exist necessarily. But many philosophers take the issue to be unresolved. In a certain sense, we could say that from their point of view it is possible that numbers really exist. Furthermore, if they exist, they exist necessarily. But this is not the same as admitting that they do exist.

Should this bother Anselm?

Not really. The sense of "possible" just invoked is not the one he has in mind. Take someone who has not been through the proof that there is no largest prime. In a certain sense it is possible from his point of view that there is a largest prime. But all this means is that he hasn't yet thought things through. In fact, it is not possible at all that there is a largest prime, even though it may seem possible before we think about it carefully. When Anselm says "if [the GCB] can be thought to exist, it does necessarily exist" he means "if the GCB can truly, coherently be thought to exist, it exists necessarily." And a coherent thought of something isn't just a matter of mentally pronouncing some words.

Anselm goes on to put the point more strongly. It is not just that if the GCB can be thought to exist, it must exist.

at all

Why?

The reasoning at this point is dense. Let's proceed one sentence at a time.

For no one who denies or doubts that something than which a greater cannot be thought exist, denies or doubts that if it did exist, it would be unable to fail to exist either in reality or in the understanding. Suppose you think there is no GCB. You still agree, Anselm says, that if there were, it would have to exist, both in reality and in the understanding. Otherwise, it wouldn't be the GCB.

Is this right?

The questionable part is the reference to the understanding. Why couldn't there be a thing that exists necessarily but is beyond our powers to conceive? But that worry is beside Anselm's point. Anselm isn't proving that God must exist in the understanding; he is taking for granted that God does exist in our understanding -- that we grasp the concept of the GCB. His central point is that if it exists in reality as well, it does so necessarily, and that this is part of our understanding of the GCB. And with that we move on to the next step in the argument:

But whatever can be thought, but does not in fact exist, could (if it did exist) fail to exist either in reality or in our understanding. Consider something that can be thought or conceived of but that fails to exist in reality. A golden mountain would be an example. The fact that it doesn't exist in reality means that even if it did, it wouldn't have to exist; even if it existed, it would be a contingent being and not a necessary being. Furthermore, the only way we can think of it coherently is to think of it as contingent. Anyone who claims he can think of a necessarily existing golden mountain is lying or confused. It makes no more sense to think of the golden mountain as having necessary existence than it does to think of the number three as having purple running lights. But now see where this takes us. If God didn't exist, the thought of God would be the thought of a contingent being. However, the thought of God is of a necessary being. Otherwise, the thought wouldn't be of the GCB. That is, otherwise, we could conceive of something even greater than the thing we are thinking of. The only coherent thought of God is of a being that exists necessarily. And this leads Anselm to his conclusion:

So if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it cannot fail to exist. The argument here is actually quite delicate. You might try to resist it. You might say "The only coherent thought of God is of a being such that if it exists, it exists necessarily." But Anselm would reply that the "if" clause here is either not doing anything at all or else is treating God as contingent. If it isn't doing anything, we can leave it out and get: the only coherent thought of God is of a being that exists necessarily. On the other hand, treating God as contingent is to miss the point that it is part of the very idea of God that God is not contingent.

Here we come back to two essential points in Anselm's original argument. The first is that if a being can be thought of as non-existent, the thought is automatically not of a being than which none greater can be thought. The second is that to have God in the understanding is not just to say the words; it is to grasp the concept itself. If I really, truly, have the concept itself, I can't think of God as non-existent. Put another way, if I can think of God as non-existent, this shows that I don't yet have the concept.

The next section points out some further consequences of the idea that God is that than which none greater can be conceived. We already saw that God would have to be eternal. Anselm argues that he would have to be without parts and everywhere present at all times. Otherwise he could be conceived as as non-existent. This section is interesting, but it is no essential to the reply to Guanilo and so we will pass over it without further comment. The next paragraph insists that we really do understand the concept of God. Since Anselm offers no real proof but mainly just insists, we will pass over that as well. (To be fair, he has tried to illustrate various features of the GCB, and to this extent, he makes a case that we really can understand it.

The discussion up to know has been long and complex. But one point keeps coming through. Anselm is constantly reminding us that necessary existence is part of the concept of God. His reply to Guanilo's first point has stressed that theme unceasingly. To grasp the concept of God is to have in mind a being that can't coherently be thought of as non-existent. That is the difference between the concept of God and the concepts of things such as a golden mountain or an as-yet-unpainted painting. That is why the idea of God is not in our understanding is just the same way as these ideas of these non-existent things. And that is what Guanilo has overlooked.

We come to Anselm's reply to the "Lost Island" example. And here we are left puzzled. Anselm seems to miss Guanilo's point. He writes as Guanilo were considering an argument from the mere existence of the concept to the reality of the island:

But, you say, this is just the same as if someone were to claim that it cannot be doubted that a certain island... truly exists in reality, because someone can easily understand it when it is described to him in words. But that isn't Guanilo's point. It isn't just that we can describe the island. It is that our description includes the idea of its being greater than all other islands. He imagines someone who says: if you deny the existence of this island, you are contradicting yourself. Because if it doesn't exist, it isn't greater than all other islands. And the assumption was precisely that it is greater than all other islands. In other words, Guanilo is saying: even though there might seem to be a contradiction in denying the existence of this island, there is no such island.

The reply Anselm gives at this point seems to be no reply at all. He says that if his argument applies to anything except the GCB, he will find the Lost Island himself. In other words, he is saying that the argument works for the GCB but not for other things. Perhaps that's so. But we would like to know why. Guanilo's argument surely raises a suspicion. Anselm needs to meet the suspicion head on.

Is there anything we can say on Anselm's behalf?

We can say of the Lost Island: "If it existed, it would be greater than any other island." The "if" clause here indeed indicates contingency. But that is fine. Islands, of their very nature, are contingent things. So we can avoid the contradiction by understanding talk of the lost island hypothetically. There is no contradiction in saying "Existing islands are greater than non-existing islands. If the Lost Island existed, it would be greater than any other existing island. But the Lost Island doesn't exist." However, we saw that Anselm is in effect saying that such hypothetical talk can't be used in the case of "that than which a greater cannot be thought." It can't be used because the GCB would have to have necessary existence.

In short, whether or not the concept of God is utterly unique, it has a very special feature compared to most concepts. It is the concept of a necessary being. Assuming the concept makes sense at all, then, reading statements about God's existence hypothetically is either to add nothing at all or to treat the concept as though it were about contingent beings.

This does lead us to wonder though. Does the initial statement of Anselm's argument really work? Do we really get a contradiction? In Anselm's Chapter Two, "That God Truly Exists," it is bare existence rather than necessary existence that appears in the argument. Necessary existence enters the argument only in Chapter 3.

Interestingly, one of Anselm's own arguments suggests that mere existence isn't enough. As we noted, Guanilo uses the phrase "greater than everything else." Anselm objects. We might have the idea of something that is greater than everything else, but Anselm seems to think that it wouldn't follow that this thing had to exist. He imagines someone who says that a certain existing thing is greater than everything else that exists, but that (a) this thing does not exist necessarily, and (b) something even greater can be thought of that doesn't actually exist. It seems to him that there is nothing obviously incoherent in all of this. And the reason is that simply being greater than everything else doesn't obviously include the idea of necessary existence.

Anselm's reply takes up only one other point, and it is one on which we won't dwell. Guanilo has the fool argue that we can't form an idea of the GCB by relying on knowledge of things of the same sort. This calls into question the very idea that we understand the concept at all. Anselm offers various illustrations of how, by using comparative notions, we can form an idea of "that than which a greater cannot be thought."

The real question is: what should we make of Anselm's argument?

One of the most popular objections to it came many centuries after it was first proposed. This objection is due to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, and it insists that existence is not a "predicate" -- i.e., is not a quality, and therefore can't make a thing greater. Perhaps that is so; as we just noted, mere existence may well not be enough to make the argument work. But necessary existence is a different and richer concept, and Anselm in effect insists that it has considerable content. It implies, for example, that the thing in question has no beginning. Necessary existence, arguably, is a predicate, i.e. is a property that things can have. If so, Kant's objection fails.

But does Anselm's argument stand?

The conservative statement of Anselm's argument is this: "if that than which a greater cannot be thought can be thought at all, it cannot fail to exist." Those are Anselm's words. The question is: can this being actually be thought?

The answer might seem to be an obvious yes. But things like this are not at all obvious. As we already saw, in mathematics, it might seem that certain concepts are coherent -- "largest prime" being our example -- that in fact are not. A necessary being is one that, among other things, is indivisible and is wholly present everywhere and at all times. Are you sure you understand that concept? And to count as God, this being must also have some person-like characteristics. It must be wise and good and powerful. Is it really clear that these sorts of characteristics can be in a thing that has no parts or body? The answer may be yes, but it isn't just obvious.

This is to put the matter in terms of thought and concepts. But most philosophers today prefer (rightly or wrongly) to put it in a way that refers to reality itself. The connection is this: as Anselm sees it, God is possible if the concept of God is coherent. Not all philosophers would agree, but most would, I suspect. And so let us move form talk of concepts to talk of things. For God to be actual, God must be possible. One way of putting Anselm's argument is that if God is even possible, God must exist necessarily. Now it may seem obvious that God is a possible being. But it may seem equally obvious that it is at least possible that there is no God. And if God must exist necessarily if at all, then, as various commentators have pointed out, we get an argument for a very different conclusion from Anselm's: God does not exist. In brief, the argument is this:

If God exists, then God exists necessarily (God can't fail to exist.)
If it is possible for a thing not to exist, then it does not exist necessarily.
It is possible that God doesn't exist.
Therefore, God doesn't exist necessarily.
Therefore, God doesn't exist.

We might dub this an ontological argument for the non-existence of God. And it has a certain economy when compared with at least some readings of Anselm's own argument. Anselm needs to move from the coherence of the concept of God to God's actually existing as a necessary being. Even if Anselm has convinced you that this move is plausible, it is surely not just obvious. In fact, it might be argued, it is at least as obvious that God's non-existence is a possibility as that if God existence is possible, he exists necessarily.

What might Anselm say in reply? He would probably object that simply talking in terms of possibility and bypassing thought is to miss a crucial part of his argument. The point of stressing the conceivability of God is not because that builds a bridge to the more austere concept of possibility. It is that if I have the concept of God -- really, truly have the concept -- I am thinking of something that I can't think of as non-existent. That means that if God's existence really seems to me to be a possibility, I am not in possession of the concept that Anselm is working with.

Of course, this leads to an obvious question: is anyone actually in possession of this concept? Some of the most intractable differences between theists and atheists may well turn on how they answer this question. It also leads to a subtler question: is Anselm offering a proof that God exists? Or a proof that we must believe He does? Clearly Anselm thought he was offering the former. But if the argument rests -- as it seems to -- on what we can and can't conceive, we are led to puzzling questions about how we must conceive things is related to how things really are.

In any case, we seem to have a standoff here. If you are convinced that you really grasp the concept of the being than which none greater can be thought, and grasp it so deeply that you fully fathom the idea of God's non-existence as inconceivable, you stand with Anselm. But if you think there is nothing incoherent in saying that God does not exist, you have to stand against him. Some may well decide that this particular battle argument is not the place to take a stand at all.

Web Surfer's Caveat: These are class notes, intended to comment on readings and amplify class discussion. They should be read as such. They are not intended for publication or general distribution.

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